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listerical lackgrqyn4. Becau.e experienced clinicians so frequently 
are required to make diagnoses with little information and little time, 
the feeling has developed that clinical judgment was an intuitive process. 
This feeling brought with it the implication that clinical judgment had a 
mystical quality that made it unapproachable by ordinary scientific means. 
Coing against this tradition. Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960) produced a 
clinical judgment model based on the processes of syllogistic reasoning. 
There are several stages in the process of clinical judgment according to 
their analysis; namely, the development of a postulate system in the person 
doing the judging, the eduction of premises, the establishment of cues and 
their use to instantiate the object, and the drawing of conclusions from 
the instantiation in terms of the predicate of the major premise (Serbin 
et al., 1960, p. 20). Taking another approach, Hoffman (1960) adopted a 
mathematical model based on information theory. Both of these approaches 
present difficulties that hinder fruitful research. Sarbin!! Al., have 
given a good rational analysie of clinical judgment, but they have not 
given much in the way of testable hypotheses (Hunt" Jones, 1962). While 
hypotheses are forthcoming from Hoffman's mathematical model, they are not 
presently testable because available analyses of clinical judgment have 
not identified with sufficient precision the cues or inputs that are 
1 
2 
pertinent to an information theory model. 
An earlier attempt by Meehl (1954) seems to offer a somewhat more 
hopeful approach. He considers the processes involved in clinical 
judpent as analogous to those involved in actuarial prediction. Meehl 
suggests that making statistical predictions on the basis of actuarial 
tables is a more exact way of dOing much of what a clinician does in making 
intuitive decisions. the clinician has a finite number of facts that he 
puts together in different combinations of tmportance to make predictions. 
He also possesses a series of "rules of thumbtt that he uses in making 
decisions. The operations that a clinician goes through in making a 
decision based on a set of facts can be done by a clerical worker, a 
calculator, and actuarial tables. !be actuarial method is likely to be 
more accurate in predicting because the method assigns the weights that 
are opttmal for best predictions to the different facts. While Meehl 
favors the use of the superior actuarial method and its high predictive 
value, he realizes that even if vast actuarial tables and techniques were 
available they could not replace the clinician in the creative act of 
making a hypothesis. Hunt and Jones (1962) state that the actuarial 
method is theoretically the best method of clinicQI diagnosis; but they 
realize that at the present time the actuarial method is not the answer 
to the problems of clinical diagnusis. Preventing ihe fulfillment of the 
actuarial method's promise of accuracy is the fact that the actuarial 
approach is useful only in areas where refined tests are available. the 
actuarial approach is also hampered by public opinion, which objects to 
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the use of machines in making judgments about men. 
RAvalgpmcnt £i.tho Psy,hophysical ISgdel. Because of these difficulties, 
Hunt (1959) feels that the presently used clinical methods should be 
improved through research. One cf the difficulties encountered in doing 
research on clinical judgment is that any given judgment is based on a 
unique set of facts that cannot be reproduced. Underwood (1957) points 
out that one of the requirements for scientific investigation is a reliable 
phenomenon. !he kind of clinical judgment that occurs in daily clinical 
practice would seem to lack this prerequisite of reliability and thus not 
be amenable to scientific study. Bunt (1959) suggests that if the 
clinician making repeated clinical jud~nts were made the focus of 
clinical research, clinical judgment could be made the subject of scien-
tific investigation. 
Ivery clinical judgment has its unique aspects, but each also shares 
certain commonalities with other judgments, particularly those made by the 
same judge. !hese commonalities can be the subject of rigorous scientific 
investigation as the determinants of individual judgments by a single 
clinician. By the same token. the variables that influence agreement among 
several judges can be studied by comparing judgmental performance in 
identical, or at least similar, situations. !his concept of interjudge 
agreement forms the basis for much of Huntts work. 
Hunt (1959) has suggested that the situation in which several 
clinicians are asked to make repeated judgments on the same clinical 
material is analagous to the paradigm of classical psychophysics. In his 
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work Runt uses the method of sinzle ~timuli by having clinical material 
rated along some scale. It is hoped that clinical judgment can be shown to 
be one of .evera! phenomena. embodied within the general eat_aory of judgment. 
If this 1s true, then much of t~~ literatl~e pertaining to psychophysical 
judgment can he broueht. to bear on the problem of cUnical judgment. 
In the context of the psychophysical model, Hunt and Arnhoff (1956) 
have d_onstrated that clinical juclgment is reliable as measured by inter-
judge agreement. Other workers (Campbell. Kunt 7 6: Lewis, 1957. Campbell, 
Lewis, and Hunt. 1958) have shown that the context effects well known to 
classical psychophysics (Beebe.(enter, 1929; Helson. 1947; Hunt, 1941; Bunt 
1& Volkmann, 1937~ and Johnson, 1955) are also found in clinical judgment. 
In eIas.ieal psychophysic.) variables that are lOlically related to 
the field of learning have been shown to affect judpent. Kelson (1947 t 
1948) haa shown that the Is' previous aCCluaintance with s1ailar stimuli 
changes the 18' adaptat:f.on level (a phenomenon in which perception of 
previous stitm.lli will influence perception of subsequent stimuli.). It 
would .... thatexperienced clinicians should be better able to make 
clinical judpents than naive judges .ince they have had experience with 
a wider range of stimuli. Several investigators (Cria, 1958, aunt, Jones, 
1& aunt, 1957; Jones, 1957; Cline, 1955) have confirmed the above. 
"a,nlna lMoD'.IW! JuS.nt;. In efforts to relate clinical judgment 
to other areas of paychology. HUGt and his co-workers have begun to 
investigate the relationship betueen clinical judgment and learning theory. 
In doing this llunt and Jones (1962) hope that clinical judament will become 
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lucre firmly anchored in experimental psyehology. Gibson (1953) reviewed 
many studies showing that absolute judgments made with the method of sinale 
stiIauli improve when there is only practice but no correction or knowledge 
of results. Ammons (1955) r~v1ewed eJ~rtments dealing with different 
types of judgments and perceptual-motor performances and concluded that 
learning is faster and reaches a higher level with knowledge of results and 
that the more specific the knowled&e the roore the rapid the improvement. 
In consideration of the above evidence Blumberg (1961) predicted that (a> 
practice in making clinical judgments with no knowledge of results would 
lead to more rapid, reliable, and valid judsmentsi (b) even more rapid, 
reliable, and accurate clinical judgments would result if the judge were 
given specific knowledge of the correct judgmental responses; (c) clinical 
judgments of an intermediate degree of rapidity, reliability, and validity 
would result if only general feedback were given to tile judges; and (d) 
there would be transfer of training (greater rapidity, reliability, and 
validity of judgments) when new stimuli were judged. Having §.S rate the 
vocabulary responses from hospitalized schizophrenics on a 7-point scale 
of exhibited disorganization, Blumbers found that the three conditions made 
no difference in the rapidity of the judgments, and that hypothesis (4) 
above was not supported in that the reliability and the validity of the 
clinical judgments did not improve when the judges received only practice 
and no feedback, but the reliability and validity of the clinical judsmenta 
did improve when the judges received the general and specific feedback as 
predicted in hypotheses (b) and (c) above. '!'be hypothesis that there 
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would be transfer of training in all three conditions was not supported in 
that transfer was found only in the condition in which the judges received 
specific feedback. 
One of the more vigorous areas of research in the field of learning 
has been the concept of drive as measured by anxiety scales (Sarason, 1960). 
Taylor (1951, 1953, 1956) developed the first arud.ety aeale to receive wid.-
apread attention. Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Seale (hereafter referred to 
as HAS) was originally designated as an operational measure of Bull's drive 
in an eyelid conditioning experiment (Taylor, 1951). Taylor developed the 
Bul1ian based hypothesis that different sources of drive summate in!s to 
produce a total effective drive state (D) that sets the strength of the 
conditioned eyelid response. Taylor assumed that different levels of 
psychiatrically defined "manifest anxiety" would be indicative of different 
levels of generalized drive. She obtained 65 true-false items which 80 
percent of a group of clinical staff members chose as being indicative of 
manifest anxiety as it was operationally defined. !he 65 selected items 
were part of a group of 200 lIMP! it .... that the clinicians judged. 'l'he 
original MAS iteas were mixed in with 135 MMPI items not related to anxiety. 
Taylor's original scale was later (1953) cut to 50 it ... that showed 
the laiaheat correlation with the total score, and these 50 items were 
mixed with the L, K, and r scales of the HMPI and MMPI items scored on 
Wesley's rigidity scale. !he final scale numbered 225 items and has been 
called the Biographical Inventory. 
Taylor (1951) found that high anxious!s (is scoring high on the MAS) 
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were consistently superior to low arudous ls (!s scoring low on the HAS) in 
the amount of eyelid conditioning (bereafter high anxious Is will be 
referred to as HA and low anxious Is as LA). The results were statistically 
significant. An attempt, through two sets of differential instructions 
after 20 eyelid conditioning trials, to induee experimentally differing 
levels of stress in the I. failed to produce any statistically significant 
differenees. Taylor interpreted the differential eyelid conditioning 
obtained for the two groups of ls selected on the basts of their HAS scores 
as meaning that the drive level of the HA Is was hiaber than that of the 
LA. Is and henee that the growth curves of the excitatory potentials for the 
two groups of Is were different. Taylor also suggested that on the basis 
of Bullts (1943) postulate that the growth of excitatory potential was 
dependent upon both habit strength (B) and drive (0), the d:l.fferenee in 
the growth curves of excitatory potential in the two groups (inferred from 
differences in the conditioning curves) might be due to chanaes in both 0 
and H. In such a ease, the SA 1s would react 1IlOl"e strongly to the uncon-
ditioned sttmu1us tmplying that the same physical sttmulus had a different 
psychological value for the HA Is and LA ls. Taking into consideration 
Bull's (1943) postulate that reward partially determines H, the termination 
of the uncond:l.tioned sttmulus should produce a greater reduction of 0 in 
the BA 18. and, therefore t increase K. 
While higher drive level (inferred from higher HAS score.) should lead 
to better performance in a situation where there is only one habit evoked, 
the predictions for tasks in which there are several available habits having 
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differing levels of availability are more complex. taylor (1956) suggested 
that in a complex task two other Hullian (1943) concepts must be used. 
!bey are oscillatory inhibition (0) and threshold (L). !he follOWing 
characteristics are attributed to 0: (a) 0 varies from moment to moment 
such that the distribution of 0 for a group of individuals on the same 
response at any moment would be approximately normal; (b) 0 plays an inhibi· 
tory role, subtracting from excitatory potential and thus giving rise to 
momentary excitatory potential. Por a given response to occur, the momentary 
excitatory potential must be higher than the threshold value (L) for that 
response. It is assumed that the value of t is the same for like habit 
tendencies evoked in a particular situation. In a task where several 
response tendencies are available in competition, the one that will take 
place is the one with highest momentary excitatory potential. Keeping in 
mind the postulate that excitatory potential is dependent upon habit 
strength, other things being equal, the response tendency with the greatest 
B and therefore the greatest excitatory potential has the greatest prOba~ 
bility of taking place. Adding the conception of D as affecting excitatory 
potential, when the desired response is weaker (lower R) than one or more 
competing response tendency, tlle 1s with higher D will perform less well 
than !s with lower D. One further possibility exists in that responses 
having very weak habit strengths may gain enough excitatory potential to 
be above threshold, thus reducing the probability of the correct response 
in the high D Is. In the case where the correct response is maximally 
available t heightened drive would make performance superior for high drive 1s. 
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While Blumberg (196l) had established dtat learning (improvement in 
reliability and validity) did take place when is had general and specific 
feedback, there were indications that different kinds of learning took place 
even with no feedback. For example, rating the same stimuli (schizophrenics' 
vocabulary test responses) over six trials reduced the latencies over trials 
of the es' judgments even with no feedback. This finding was replicated in 
another study (Hunt and Blumberg, 1961). If nothing else, the is were 
learning their own jud~wntal responses better. 
A:rud.ety.!..W! Clinical Judent. The question arose as to just tmen a 
subject, in making repeated judgments, is judging evaluatively and when he 
is simply repeating previous responses. '!'he assumed parallel to the l' s 
el:.perimental judging is that of a clinical situation in which a practicing 
clinician gets faster and faster in making clinical evaluations. When does 
the clinician stop making clinical, judgmental evaluations and simply start 
repeating previously learl~ responses to relevant stimuli? An attempt was 
made to answer the above question for the is making experimental jud~nts 
by applying Taylor's drive theory to the task of repeated clinical judgments. 
is who score high on the MAS should initially perform less well than Is who 
score low on the MAS. The difference in performance of high and low scorers 
on the MAS should shrink with repeated jud1Jl18nts and they should perform 
equally well. According to drive theory (Taylor, 1956), those is scoring 
higner on the HAS would have a greater response probability for competing 
responses, thus making incorrec t responses more likely. However) once the 
high MAS scorers establish the correct response, they should perform with 
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shorter latency than low MAS scorers. l11e disorganizationsl cU4S upon 
which the rating of the schizophreuic·s test responses is based would provide 
the cOft\peting response tendencies in the above formulation. The paint at 
which the performance curves for the high MAS scorers and low ~ scorers 
would cross, as predicted by drive theory, would be the point at which 
evaluative jud~nt stopped and the elicitation of learned verbal responses 
began. Runt and Blumberg (1961) had higb MAS scorers and low MAS scorers 
rate 21 schizophrenics' vocabulary test responses on a '-point scale of 
disorganization in different orders over sb: trials. 'l'be measures of 
learning were latency, the number of shifts in judgment, reliability or 
interjudge agreement, and validity as represented by the agreement of the 
judge with the standardized values of the stimuli. All four measures indi-
cated that learning took place. Only the reliability and validity measures, 
however, differentiated the high MAS scorers frQlll the low MAS scorers, with 
the low MAS scorers being superior to the high MAS scorers on trial one and 
the differences diminishing by the sixth trial. 'l'he perfort'l'l4nce curves of 
~le two groups of Is did not cross) thus placing this particular application 
of Taylor's drive theory itt doubt. 
As a check on the results of the Hunt and Blumberg (1961) study~ Runt 
and Walker (1963) reanalyzed the data with a tr1al-by-trial analysis and 
obtained a significant difference between the DA Is and. LA 1s only on the 
first trial. Hunt and Walker also exactly replicated the Runt-Blumberg 
study with a new set of subjects. 'l'he results paralleled the reanalysis of 
the Hunt-Blumberg study except for what was probably a ehanee difference 
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between the HA Ss and LA Ss on trial two. 
- -
To check the possibility that there were not enough trials to permit 
the crossing of the performance curves of the HA and LA §,s J Hunt and Walker 
(1963) did a second study utilizing 100 different standardized schizophrenic 
test responses presented in 10 sets of 10 stimuli equated in range of 
standardized stimulus values. While the Hunt and Blumberg study (1961) and 
Uunt and Walker's (1963) replication of it demonstrated that HA and LA !8 
were differentiated in performance on repeated judgments of the same stimuli, 
the use of 100 different stimuli permitted the researchers to find out if 
the performance differences of HA and LA !s would also be present if only a 
general frame of reference was learned. Htmt and walker' s second experiment 
(1963) showed that only on the first set of 10 sttmuli did LA §,s perform 
better than the ItA ,!s with the two groups of §.S being equally reliable on 
the remaining nine sets of stimuli. hcause the results of three different 
studies did not support Taylor's (1956) drive theory in its prediction of 
the crossing of the performance curves of the HA and LA §.s, Hunt and Walker 
(1963) suggested that what Child describes as "irrelevant respor.ses made to 
anxiety" (1954; P. 151.) were greater for !s who scored high on the MAS than 
for !s who scored low on the MAS, and that the RA 1s eliminated the task 
irrelevant responses quickly, allowing their performance to come up to that 
of the LA .!s. 
Soc,al Situatigll and Clinical Judgment. MBny of the clinical judpnt 
studies done by Hunt and/or his co-workers dealt with subjects and experi-
menters in a one .. to-one relationship. Walker, Hunt, and Schwartz (in press) 
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have integrated Child's (1954) interpretation that BA!s have more task 
irrelevant responses with a discussion of the relation of stress and task 
irrelevant responses presented ~y Spence (lt63). they applied their 
integration to the comparison of 1s making clinical judgments in a co-acting, 
non-interactina group and 1s making clinical judgments in an individual 
(or one-to-one) situation. 
Walker ~~. (in press) had noted that there was apparent le •• ening 
of tension for !s in experiments on judgment if the 1s judged in a group 
rather than individually. Spence (1963) suggests that the 1ntens1ty of task 
irrelevant responses is related to the amount of stress in an expertmental 
s1tuation. On the bas1s of the above. Walker .!1.!1. predicted that the 
BA 1s would have a lowered or actual intensity of task irrelevant response. 
relative to LA Is when both judged in a group situation. Such a difference 
between Is working in a group and individually was assumed to be due to the 
existence of comparatively lea. stress in a group clinical juds-ent experi-
ment as compared to a clinical judgment experiment in which there is a one-
to-one relationship between the I and the !. 
In three independent experiments that utilized a group testing situation, 
the ab~ conclusions were supported (Walker et al., in press). In two 
experiments there were no signif1cant d1fferences between BA and LA!s over 
many clinical judgments. In the rema1ning experiment the BA 1s were 
super10r to t't-.e LA 18 in early judgments but not 1n later ones. 
Allport (1920, 1924) made clinical observations that appear to be in 
contrast to those that Walker at ale (1n press) reported. In ciescr1bing 
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the individual differences among the !s who worked in groups and relating 
the individual differences to their experimental performances on non-
judgmental tasks, Allport remarked that some "nervous" 1s were not helped 
by working in a group but were bindered. Allport did not have an objective 
measure of ttnervousness". If what Allport called nervousness were assumed 
to be a drive characteristic possessed by SA 18, it could be suggested that 
SA is would have poorer judgmental ability in a group situation. !his 
paradox may be explained when one considers tbat Allport' s observations 
about nervous individuals were JUde on is perform1ng non-judgmental tasks 
and experimental group situations that many 18 described aa competitive. 
In the experiments done by Walker e1 a1. the task was a judgmental 
situation whicb would be unlikely to produce competition among the is. !hue, 
the variable of competition or no competition among !s might account for the 
diaparate results. 
In an unpublished study, Pribyl (1963) had two random groups of naive 
Is rate SO schizophrenic vocabulary responses on a 7-point scale of disorgan-
ization. One group was tested individually and. the other was tested in a 
co-acting group. The SO stimuli were presented in 5 sets 84uated in range 
of atimuli used. There was no significant difference between the two groupa 
in reliability <aa represented by interjudge agreement) on the first three 
seta of stimuli. On the fourth and fifth sets of stimuli there was a drop 
in reliability of the group judging individually J causing a significant 
difference between the two groups on these trials. two more random groups 
were tested in exactly the same way with the addition of stress instructions 
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that informed the Is that those who made less reliable ratings of the 
stimuli were in need of psychological counseling. '£he results for the two 
stress groups paralleled that of the neutral group. Stress instructions 
had no significant effect on the Is receiving them. A differential effect 
had been hypothesized. the expectation being that stress instructions would 
ntake" in an individual setting but not in a group aituation. In the f01!'lll8r 
stress instructions would produce a decrement in performance; in the latter 
they would produce no difference in performance since these !s would not 
believe that the instructions applied to all of them. 
Perhaps some characteristic of the ! affected the la tested in groups 
differently from the Is tested individually, or the greater stress assumed 
by Walker et al. (in press) to be operating in the individual situation 
heightened the effects of fatigue for Is tested individually. It is also 
fluite possible that the results obtained in this &tOOy were, in fact, a 
chance finding. 
Purpose. The present experiment compared more accurately the differ-
ential effects of group versus individual testing of SA and LA 18 on a 
clinical judgment task. In view of previous research and theoretical 
considerations, the following bypotheses are presented: 
Hxpothes1s.Qn.t. If BA judses and LA judges make many different 
clinical judgments individually with only the .I present, the BA judges will 
initially be less reliable than the LA judges, but eventually will become 
just as reliable in their judgments as the LA judges. In the individual 
situation there will be sufficient stress as suggested by Walker et al. (in 
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prass) to affect the HA and LA!s differentially such that the HA judges will 
initially have stronger competing responses that will quickly be reduced to 
allow the HA judges to perform just as well as the LA judges. 
Itypothtds Two. If HA judges and LA judges make many different clini-
cal judgments in a non-interacting group situation. the two groups of judges 
will be equally reliable throughout the series of judgments. this prediction 
is based upon the assumption that there will be sufficiently reduced stress 
in the group situation such that the HA judges and LA judges will have ir-
relevant competing responses of cDnlparable strength. 
Hypothesis tlare!!_ The LA judges tested in the non-interacting &TOUP 
situation will initially be just as reliable as the LA judges in the indi-
vidual situation. After fllaking Mny clinical judgments the LA judges in the 
individual situation will become less reliable than the LA judges in the 
non-interacting group situation. The baSis of this prediction is a frankly 
empirical one, as this was the finding Pribyl's (1963, unpublished) study. 
At the present time no theoretical explanation can be offered that will 
adequately explain this f:i.nd:lng. 'l.'be hypothesis is presented mainly to 
attempt to replieate the previously obtained results. If hypothesis three 
1s not supported, it will imply that the previous results were due to some 
chance factor. 
Hypothesis Four. The HA judges in the non"interacting group situation 
will initially be more reliable than the HA judges in the individual 
situation. In making many clinical judgments the HA judges in the individual 
situation will become just as reliable as the HA judges in the group 
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situation. After an evell greater number of judgments, the IIA judges in the 
individual situation will become less relia.ble than the HA judges in the 
group situation. In other words ~ HA judges in an individual situation are 
at first less reliable, then as reliable, and then again less reliable than 
UA judges in a group situation. a.ssuming that a fairly large number of 
judgxaents are made. 
Method 
Subiec~s. .All of the .§.S who particip:lted in the experiment were drawn 
from the pool of .§.S maiutained at the Lake Sbore Campus of Loyola University. 
There is a course requiremcr.t that all ~eneral psychology students must 
participate in five one-hour experiments. Since there are more e~:periments 
d~ there are subject-hours available, the students have some leeway in 
cltoosing the experiments they participate in. 
As a regular classroom exercise all of the uudergraduate general 
psychology students took the MAS during the period of time between the 
second and the fifth tf&eks of the semester. The true-false !-tAS items were 
included in a series of similar true-false items in a personali~ question-
naire innocuously titled the Biographical Inventory. Two graduate assistants 
(other than the I> in the psychology department administered the Biographical 
Inventory. The students were told that the Biographical Inventory was being 
adminis tered in order to standardize it. 
Taylor (1953) has found that there is a consistent difference in the 
meau MAS scores for males and females with the latter invariably scoring 
higher. Because of Ta.ylorts finding and the possibility that dtere may be 
same uru~nown systecatic difference in performance of clinical judgment 
tasks, only males wcre used in the experiment. 
The male general psychology students whose scores on the MAS vere in 
the highest 20 percent a.nd the lowest 20 percent were selected from a group 
of more ~~an 80 males who were enrolled in four of the six general psychology 
sections. nle names of these students were put on a folder along with dbe 
17 
18 
statement that they had been selected randomly for the experiment. In accord 
with the usual procedure for obtaining Is, the folder (having appointment 
times in it) was passed around the four sections. The I tested these 1s 
individually. 
The BA judges and LA judges for the non-interacting group condition 
were selected on the basis of MAS scores from the distribution of HAS scores 
of the 80 males in the remaining two general psychology sections held on 
take Shore Campus. As was true for the 1s in the individual condition, the 
UA judges were those males with HAS scores in the top 20 percent of the 
distribution and the LA judges were those males with MAS scores in the 
lowest 20 percent of the distribution. To make the group setting as natural 
as possible, the expertment was run during the regular class period of the 
two general psychololY sections. Data were collected from all of the 
students of both secti~ns, but only the data from the students selected on 
the basis of their MAS scores were analyzed. 
StimMli. The stUauli were the 100 schizophrenics' vocabulary test 
responses used by Hunt and Walker (1963). These stimuli had previously 
been standardized by experienced clinicians on a 7-point scale according to 
the amount of exhibited disorganization (Hunt & Jones, 1962). The stimuli 
were presented in 10 sets consisting of 10 responses each. lach set con-
tained two st~uli at each of the first three scale points and one stimulus 
at each of the four remaining scale pOints of the 7-point scale used by the 
clinicians. 
Pros,dMre. The Is in the individual condition were tested in one of 
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the experimental booths at the Lake Shore Campus. The st~uli were presented 
by means of a projector on a screen approxtmately four feet away from the 1. 
The I sat to the left of the 1 and behind him, at a table on which the pro-
jector rested. The! called out his rating and the ! recorded it on a data 
sheet like the one shown in Appendix A. After the experiment was completed 
the I asked each 1 the questions presented on the Questionnaire in Appendix L 
The Is in the non-interacting group condition were given a data sheet 
like the one shown in Appendix A. They filled in their own responses. At 
the end of the experiment the data sheets were collected and the QuestionnaUa 
passed out. !he!s were asked to put their names on the Questionnaire (shown 
in Appendix B) and to fill it out. 
All !s received the same instructi~ns. !hey were told that their re-
sponses would be confidential and would not influence their standing in the 
general psychology cour,se. !hen the following instructions, taken from Hunt 
and Walker (1963, p. 495) were read: 
I~e are going to present you with a number of responses made 
by schizophrenic patients to vocabulary test items taken from an 
intelligence test. One of the ways in which the pathology of 
schizophrenia may express itself is through disorganized thinking 
which results in atypical, unusual, or 'abnormal' responses to 
the items on such a test. !he qualitative interpretation by the 
clinician of such test responses i8 one of the bases upon which 
he may make a clinical or diagnostic interpretation. The extent 
of the disorganization exhibited in these responses is not uni-
form. In some of the responses it is .in~l and others it is 
extreme. 
"You are asked to rate these responses on a 7-point scale, 
from I through 7, according to the severity of the disorganization 
exhibited in the response, with the low end of the scale represent-
ing .inteal disorlanization and the h1S! end of the seale repre-
senting maximal disorganization. In making these ratings we are 
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asking you to concentrate upon the severity of the disorganization 
exhibited in the response. In essence, what we are asking you to 
do is to judge how 'schizophrenic' each response is. Some re-
sponses will seem quite normal; those you would rate '1'. Others 
will be so disorganized as to require a '7' rating. !be majority 
will fall somewhere in between. 
liVe are now going to project onto the screen a stimulus word 
and the response to it. think out your rating carefully, but as 
soon as you make up your mind give your response. 
"First you will be given three practice trials. Do you have 
any questions before we begin? You will have an opportunity to 
ask questions after the practice trials, but once the experiment 
starts you will have to hold all questions until the end of the 
experiment. 1 shall be glad to answer any additional questions at 
that time." 
!ben three practice sttmuli were presented. The ratings given by the 
clinical psychologists were announced to the 1s as the appropriate slide was 
presented. At this time any questions were answered. 
The ten trials were then presented. In the non-interacting group 
condition the stimuli were presented for approximately five seconds each. 
Enough time was taken between sets to change the slide tray in the projector 
and announce the number of the next set. Por the !s run individually each 
slide was presented only for the amount of time that it took the! to give 
his rating. Between sets the I simply changed the slide tray in the pro-
jector. 
After the Questionnaire had been filled out the I answered any ad-
ditional questions and requested that the 1s not discuss the experiment with 
their friends. 
R.esults 
After all of the data were collected, data from Is who did not follow 
directions or who knew about the experiment beforehand were eliminated. 
After the above mentioned Is' data vere eliminated, theTe vere four groups 
of 16 !s each. The range of the MAS scores of the HA judges who performed 
in the non-interacting group condition was from 23 to 38 while the range of 
MAS scores for the HA judges performing in the individual condition was from 
26 to 34. The range of the MAS scores for the LA judges tested in class was 
from 1 to 7 while the range for the LA judges tested individually was from 
1 to 9. The ranges of scores are quite comparable to previous research in 
this area. 
In the data analysis each Its rati~gs of each set of 10 stimuli were 
correlated with the ratings for the same set of stimuli of each of the other 
members of his group. Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient was 
used. Each of the £'8 was converted into a A' value according to the table 
presented by Edwards (1960). Mean &' values were then computed for each of 
the four 16-member groups of !os on a set-by-set basis. 
Duncan's new multiple range test was used to test the significance of 
the differences between the means of the four groups on a set-by-set basis. 
!be Duncan's range test was used to eliminate the spuriously large number 
of significant! values that would be obtained if a single mean were used 
in more than one comparison. The set-by.set means and the results of the 
range tee t are presented in Appendix C. '!'he comparisons between the pairs 
of means that are of interest in this study are presented in Table 1 and 
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Table 2. In all there are 60 possible combinations of pairings of two means 
through all of the 10 range tests that were done. Of the 60 comparisons, 
there are three pairs of means that are significantly different at the .01 
level and four pairs of means that are significantly different at the .05 
level. two of the pairs of means that are significantly different at the 
.05 level and one of the pairs of means that is significantly different at 
the .01 level were tlOt predicted by the hypotheses of this study. Of the 
40 pairings of means that are relevant to this study, two are significantly 
different at the .05 level and two at the .01 level. Since the protection 
level against Type I errors for the Duncan's range test where all combi-
nations of patrings of four means are tested at the .05 level is 86 percent, 
the conclusions is that those differences that were found to be significant 
were due primarily to chance. !be protection level against Type 1 errors 
for all combinations 0:' four means at the .01 level is 97 percent. In this 
case, too, one must conclude that the differences found were due to chance. 
Table 1 
Significance of Differences Between Mean Interjudge &eliabilities 
for 16 High Anxious (HA) and 16 Low Anxious (LA) 
1s in Group and. Ind.i vidual Condi tiona 
Group Individual 
HA LA HA LA 
Set Meana Meana Meana Meana 
1 1.012 1.044 0.843 1.144 
2 0.764 0.756 0.510 * 0.932 
3 1.062 1.257 0.997 1.256 
4 1.248 1.279 0.906 1.144 
5 0.849 0.821 0.685 0.873 
6 0.840 0.928 0.593 *If 1.042 
7 0.947 1.129 0.928 1.028 
8 1.281 1.212 0.829 1.109 
9 0.702 0.814 0.661 0.917 
10 1.126 1.162 0.896 1.194 
aAll means are z' values 
*Difference between means significant at .05 level according 
to Duncan's new multiple range test. 
**Difference between means significant at .01 level according 
to Duncants new multiple range test. 
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Table 2 
Significance of Differences Between Mean Interjudge aeliabilities 
for 1.6 High Anxious (HA) ~s in the Group (G) Condition and 16 
SA 18 in the Individual (1) Condition and for 16 Low Anxious 
(LA) ~s in the G Condition and 16 LA Is in the 1 Condition 
Iligh Anxious Low Anxious 
G I G I 
Set Mean Mean Mean Mean 
1 1.012 0.843 1.044 1.144 
2 0.764 0.510 0.756 0.932 
3 1.062 0.997 1.257 1.256 
4 1.248 * 0.906 1.279 1.144 
5 0.849 0.685 0.821 0.873 
6 0.840 0.593 0.928 1.042 
7 0.941 0.928 1.129 1.028 
8 1.281 ** 0.829 1.272 1.109 
9 0.702 0.661 0.814 0.911 
10 1.126 0.896 1.162 1.194 
aAll means are s' values. 
*Difference bett-reen means s1gni.ficant at .05 level according 
to Duncan's new multiple range test. 
**Difference betlreen means significant at .01 level according 
to Duncan's new multiple ran .. test. 
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A 2 x 2 x 10 analysis of variance was done on the data. the '!ariables 
being level of anxiety. social situation. and sets of stimuli. The results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 3. Values of I significant at the 
.01 level are marked with an asterisk. The results indicate a significant 
! for anxiety~ I being equal to 27.409 C..sg I and 60, p.<.Ol). Inspection of 
Figure 1 shows that. in general, the main effect of a.m'..iety was due to the 
greater reliability of L..<\ Jis. 
The I for social situation was 7.694 (sU 1 and 60, p.(.OI). While the 
relationship is complex. the reliability of ~s in the group situation is, in 
general, significantly &reater than is the interjudge reliabilit1 in the 
individual situation. The interaction effect is also significant. 1. being 
10.883 (gI 1 and 60, p.(.Ol). ~lis indicates that Ule effect of the social 
situation on clinical judgment is not independent of dle anxiety level of 
the subject. 
the effect of the 10 sets of sttmuli is significant at the .01 level, 
l. being 53.778 W 9 and 540). This can be interpreted as being due to a 
position effect or an item content effect. ttle interaction between anxiety 
and sets is not significant, indicating that reliability varies uniformly 
over sets for both levels of anxiety. 
The social situation by sets interaction is significant, I being 5.487 
~ 9 and 50~ p.<.Ol). It appears that the fluctuation in interjudge relia-
bility from set to set is not independent of the social situation. 
The I for the triple interaction. which takes into account the three 
variables of anxiety level, social situation, ~nd sets as influences on the 
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance of the .!. Values for the Mean 
Interjudee Reliabilitics for the lour Groups of Subjects 
Source of Variation 
Anxiety 
Social Situation 
Anxiety x Social Situation 
Irror <a> 
B Sets 
Anxiety x Sets 
Social Situation x Sets 
Anxiety x Social Situation x Sets 
Error (1)) 
Total 
~t.ml of 
Squares 
4.687 
1.308 
1.861 
10.245 
15.004 
.416 
1.528 
.777 
16.620 
52.446 
df 
1 
1 
1 
60 
9 
9 
9 
9 
540 
639 
*p is at 1% or less 
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Mean 
Square 
4.687 
1.308 
1.961 
.171 
1.667 
.046 
.170 
.863 
.031 
r 
27.409* 
7.649* 
10.883* 
53.778* 
1.484 
5.487* 
27.839* 
fI) 
Q) 
~ 
~ 
-NI 
.~ 
~ ;q 
·rl 
~ ;q 
8! 
(1) 
bO 
"d 
~ 
'r,) 
M 
Q) 
-tl 
~ 
H 
@ 
~ 
1.30 
1.20 
1.10 
1.00 
.90 
.80 
.70 
.60 
.50 
\ 
1 2 
~---oLow ~ious Group 
0- - - -() Low Anxious Individual 
~High Anxious Group 
o OHigh Anxious Individual 
3 6 
Sets 0 f Stimuli 
Fig. 1. Mean interjudge!reliability (in ~' values) on a set-by-set basis. 
interjudge reliability of the sut)jects. This) too, is significantly larger 
than chance. 1 t,eing 27.839 <.2: 9 and 540, p. <.01) • this resul t li.teans that 
when these three variables exist in Em experiment) they do not act inde-
pendently. 
The fluctuations from set to set in reliability over all judges led to 
a postdiction that the sets of stimuli might in themselves be of varying 
difficulty for the naive judges. To test this postdiction the me.an standard 
deviations of the clinicians that originally standardized the stimuli were 
computed on a set-by-set basis. The clinicians' mean standard deviations 
from the ratings obtained in the standardization were taken as an index of 
difficulty. These standard deviation scores and the mean z' values for all 
-
four groups were graphed on the same grid on a. set-by-set basis. This is 
presented in Figure 2. 
If the postdiction were to be supported. the IlleBn clinicia.n standard 
deviation should be low when the naive judges' interjudge reliability is 
high. This relationship holds only when going from trial 4 to 5, from 6 to 
7, possibly from 8 to 9, and from 9 to 10. !t must be noted that in 
constructing the graph, the units for the two scales were not equated. 
However, no desirable transformation would change the order of the variables. 
Apparently the changes in interjudge reliability from set to set cannot be 
interpreted solely as a function of differential difficulty of the sets. 
(/) 
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~ (/) s::: 
° l> .,-1 
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.75 
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~Mean Interjudge Reliability 
0--0. Mean Clinicians' SDs 
• 1 2 3 5 6 7 . 8 9 10 
Sets of Stinmli 
Fig. 2. Mean interjudge reliabilities (in z' values) of the four experi-
mental groups combined for each set of stinmli and the mean standard deviations 
of the clinicians' ratings of each set of stinmli. 
Discussion 
Contrary to the predictions of hypothesis one, the SA judges in the 
individual condition did not show an initial decrement in reliability. This 
result is not in agreement with the previous research of Hunt and Blumberg 
(1961) and Hunt and Walker (1963) who found that HA. judges were less reliable 
than LA judges on the initial trial in three independent studies. 
Because this initial decrement for HA Is was not found, the present 
study fails to support the Bunt and Walker (1963) hypothesis that SA judges 
had more of what Child (1954) called tltask irrelevant responses" due to 
anxiety than did LA judges. !heoretically SA Is should have done worse at 
first and then, once the task irrelevant responses were eliminated, should 
have performed on a par with the LA Is. 
!hat the expected result did not occur is surprising since the stimuli 
and methodology used replicated the Bunt and Walker (1963) study exactly. 
One can only guess that perhaps some unknown selection factor resulted in 
differing populations for the two studies or that some ! variable influenced 
the results. 
Since the Hunt and Walker study was done at Northwestern University and 
the present study at Loyola University, some unknown selection factor may 
have been a critical variable. Iven if the two populations are similar, it 
is still possible that one or the other sample was biased in some unknown 
direction. 
that an experimenter variable influenced the results is also a tenable 
hypothesis since the amount of stress in a given experiment could be related 
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to I characteristics. (&osenthAI, 1964). !he second hypothesis predicted 
that in a group situation there would be no difference in performance of BA 
and LA subjects on any trials. !his hypothesis was confirmed. Its theo-
retical relevance is, however, limited by the lack of support of hypothesis 
one since it adds no support to the Walker et al. (in press) assumption dhat 
the group testing condition is less stressful. 
Spence (1963) suggests that the amount of task irrelevant responses is 
a function of the amount of stress in the experimental condition. If the 
assumption of the group condition being less stressful than the individual 
condition were correct, the differential amount of task irrelevant responses 
of HA and LA judges should be greater in the individual condition. the 
negative results of hypothesis one of this study indicate that either the 
assumption of differential stress for group and individual condition is 
invalid or that Spence's (1963) concept of task irrelevant responses being 
a function of stress is invalid. It is impossible to indicate from the 
results which is the case. 
Hypothesis three predicted no difference for LA!s on the first trial 
as a result of individual or group testing. As was the case with hypothesis 
two, this finding of no difference is not theoretically relevant since its 
importance depended on finding a significant difference between BA and LA 
Is on the first trial of the individual condition. 
It was predicted by hypotheses three and four tbat both BA and LAjs 
in the individual situation would have a relatively poorer performance on 
later trials. The same variables that influenced the failure of the results 
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to support hypothesis one may well have been critical determinants here. 
Since the Pribyl (1963) finding had no foundation in theory it is now 
even more probable that it was no more than a chance result. On the other 
hand, it should not be dismissed too lightly in view of the fact that random 
groups of 1s participated itl Pribyl's study, while in the present study 
highly selected Is (HA and LA) participated in the individual and group 
condi tions • 
In hypothesis four the ItA judges in the individual condition were 
assumed to be in a more stressful experimental situation than the HA judges 
in the group condition. This was apparently not the case as there was no 
difference found in the initial trials of the two conditions for the HA 
judges. It was thought that HA judges in the individual condition would 
show more task irrelevant responses than HA judges in the group condition 
because of less stress in the latter condition. Either Spence (1963) is not 
correct in her assumption that task irrelevant responses are a function of 
the amount of stress, or there was insufficient stress in the individual 
condition. It is difficult to choose be~een these two explanations as 
previous research did not directly test hypotheses relating clinical 
judgment and the effects of testing 1s :tn grlJltpS and individually. 
Although no predictions were made concerning the analysis of variance, 
these results are nevertheless :tnteresting. One finding of importance is 
that the 1s in the group condition were more reliable than the 1s in the 
individual condition. This result lends support to the applicability of 
Hunt's (1959) analogy of psychophysics and ~linical judgment since it agrees 
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with findings of Allport (1920, 1924) using judgments of sensory stimuli. He 
found that sensory judgments made in a co-acting but non-interacting group 
were less extreme than if the judgments were made alone. 
!he reliability measure used in this study tells essentially how well 
the .§.S agree with each other. The higher the reliability the more alike are 
all the .§.S judgments of ct18 stimuli. Allport (1920 t 1924) also made obser-
vations somewhat parallel to the results of this study; these indicate that 
.§.8 in the group condition were more reliable than 1s in the individual con-
dition. He noticed that .§.s' free associations were more common or less 
idiosyncratic if they were made in a co-acting but non-interacting group. 
This parallel further pOints out the generality of phenomena that take place 
in clinical judgment. 
When all of the LA.§.s were combined, they were found to be more reliable 
than the HA 1s. One very speculative explanation for this might be that the 
HA 1s did make some task irrelevant responses that were not dissipated as the 
trials progressed. This is quite possible since new st~uli were presented 
on every set, and it may be that HA !8 made task irrelevant responses to 
specific stimuli as they were presented. These responses may have been 
small enough in number to produce non-significant results in the Duncan's 
test of mean differences, but their cumulative effect on the performance of 
HAls could have been picked up by the more sensitive! test. 
'l'he finding that ~ere was a good deal of variance contributed by the 
sets of stimuli and the finding that the amount of variance was not uniform 
for the group and individual conditions suggest that sets of stimuli used in 
~-- ,- Tr· 
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clinical jud~nt studies should be standardized under these conditions. 
Situational and individual difference variables are proving to be very 
tmportant in clinical judgment and future research must take these into 
account. 
SUDIIII8ry 
Previous research has shown that the relative performance of high 
anxious (HA) and low anxious (LA) 1s (operationally defined by extreme scores 
on the Taylor MlS) on the initial trials of clinical jud,..nts is different 
depending whether the HA and LA Is judged in a croup or individually. In 
this study the 1s were given the juclgmental task. of rating the amount of 
confusion exhibited in 100 vocabulary test responses taken schizophrenics' 
test protocols. The 1s rated the stimuli in ten trials or sets consisting 
of 10 stimuli each. Because of previous research HA 1s were expected to 
perform less well than LA 1s on the first trial when the !,s judged indi .. 
vidually. !hie expectation was not born out. When HA Is and LA Is worked 
in a croup there was no difference in performance as expected, but since a 
differential effect due to working in a group or individually was predicted 
the tmplicatlons of this finding are limited. Further hypothese. predicting 
a decrement in performance for both BA and LA l' judging individually on 
later trials were presented and tested but not supported. The lack. of 
replication of previous research was discussed in terms of differing subject 
populations and I variables. For exploratory purposes an analysis of 
variance was done on the .I' values of the mean interjudge rel1abllities, 
(easentially, a measure of how well the judges acreed with each other) t the 
variables being level of anxiety (IA or LA), social situation (group or 
individual condition), and aets of attmuli. It revealed that clinical 
juds-enta, like sensory judsments, tend to be more alike (better interjudge 
agreement) 1f the 1s judge in a group than 1f the 1s juclge individually. 
3S 
3.6 
this latter finding suggests that many of the characteristics of clinical 
judgment may be similar to those found in other types of judgment. 
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Appendix A 
Name 
Trial I Trial II Trial III Trial IV Trial V 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 
4 I. 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
8 8 3 3 8 
9 9 9 9 9 
10 10 10 10 10 
'trial VI Trial VII Trial VIII Trial IX Trial X 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 9 
10 10 10 10 10 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire 
1. Did you know anything about thir; experiment be::orehand? Yes 
-----
No 
2. If you did know anything about this experiment beforehand, 'What did you 
know about it" 
3. Did you understand what you were expected to do:' Yes No ___ _ 
4. 1 f the answer to the pr.evious quae don was no, t.,ma t didn't you under-
stand" 
5. Please comment below on the (!..,,<periment or any of the above queStiO'l.16. 
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Appendix C 
Duncan'a Wew Multiple Range teat Applied to the Differencea 
Provided by All Combinations of the Mean lnt:erjudge 
&eliabilitie. for All Pour Experimental 
Groups on a Set-by-Set Basia 
Set. Heans 
1 BAl- JIAGb LAGc LAId 
0.843 1.012 1.044 1.144 
2 HAl l.AG HAG LAI 
0.510 0.126 o,zr;. 0.932 
3 HAl HAG tAl LAG 
0,997 1.062 1.256 1.257 
4 HAl LAI HAG tAG 
0.906 1:1!4 11248 1.279 
• 
S HAl LAG HAG tAl 
0.685 0.821 0,849 0.873 
6 HAl HAG LAG LA! 
0.593 0.%0 0.928 1.Q42 
lit 
** 
7 HAl HAG LAI LAG 
0.928 0.947 .1.028 1.129 
8 HAl LAl LAG HAG 
0.829 1.109 It, 1.272 1.281 
9 HAl BAG l.AG tAl 
0.661 0.702 0.814 0.911 
10 HAl HAG LAG W 
Oz826 1.126 11162 1.194 
Note ... -All means are .It values. Any two means not under-
lined by the same line are significantly different. Any two 
means underlined by the .ame line are not significantly dif-
ferent. 
&sigh Anxious Individual (11-16) 
bHigh Anxious Group (1-16) 
cLow Anxious Group (N-16) 
dLow Anxious Individual (1.16) 
*Significant at ,OS level 
**Signlficant at .01 level 
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